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Book Review
A. FLEISCHER, JR., G. HAZARD, JR., AND M. KLIPPER, BOARD GAMES
(1988) ($19.95, Little Brown and Company, Boston, Massachusetts
02108).
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*
State corporate law statutes uniformly entrust the management
of the business and affairs of a corporation to the board of directors
of that corporation.' But the exercise of that authority is subject to
some degree of judicial review at the behest of disgruntled shareholders challenging the directors' action (or inaction) through the
mechanism of a derivative suit. Early case law established judicial
willingness to review the behavior of corporate directors, and established "fiduciary" duties on the part of directors to act with due
care and loyalty to the corporation. A violation by a director of his
or her fiduciary duties might give rise to liability.
The availability of the derivative action to redress shareholder
dissatisfaction with directors has led to a large and developing jurisprudence exploring the minimum level of conduct for directors.
While some cases alleging lack of due care have suggested that
directors might be liable for their simple negligence, 2 more recent
cases make clear that the standard is gross negligence. On the loyalty
side, the courts have been less forgiving; if a director benefitted
personally from a corporate action he authorized as a director, he
may be held accountable to the corporation unless he can prove that
the questioned transaction was indeed "entirely fair" to the corporation."
From this body of case law, the authors of Board Games discuss,
in some detail, director action in a half dozen or so recent cases
Associate Professor and Associate Dean, University of Colorado School
of Law at Boulder. J.D., 1974, and B.A., 1969, University of Illinois.
1. E.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs
of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject
to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation.").
2. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (S. Ct. 1940).
3. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
4. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
*
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involving corporate takeovers. 5 For the most part, these were highlypublicized cases and resulted in judicial opinions of some significance.
The authors focus on the role played by target boards in responding
to takeovers-both negotiated and hostile takeovers-and conclude
that the takeover phenomenon has increased the power and influence
of directors. They dispute the received wisdom, from Berle and
Means' classic book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, that
corporate control resides in the professional managers of a corporation. Rather, "control," in their view, "is now a troika: management, which controls operations; stockholders, who exercise
continuous pressure through their rights of ownership; and marketsensitive directors, who continually reevaluate company health. This
represents a major shift in the balance of power within the corporation
'6
in favor of the board."
While a shift of control may be occurring (although I doubt it),
the cases that the authors chose do not bear this out. Indeed, were
one to generalize, one might say that those cases demonstrate the
awesome influence that professional management exercises over corporate boards, and the judicial dissatisfaction with that state of affairs.
All of the chosen cases involved a judicial test of managementinitiated, board-approved action. The issue in each case, more or
less, was whether the process of board approval (or rubber stamp,
a cynic might say) met some abstract judicial notion of due deliberation and director disinterestedness. An examination of a few of
the chosen cases and a few that were not discussed, demonstrates
the fallacy of the authors' conclusion.
Smith v. Van Gorkom,7 a 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision,
makes its first appearance in the book's prologue and is referred to
frequently thereafter. It is a case that epitomizes the dominance of
management in the corporate hierarchy: Trans Union Corporation's
chief executive officer (Jerome Van Gorkom), on his own initiative

5. Prologue: Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Chapter 2:
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985); Chapter 3: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Dcl.
1985); Chapter 4: Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn.
1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Chapter 5: MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (1986);
Chapter 6: Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
6. A. FLEISCHER, G. HAZARD & M. KLIPPER, BOARD GAMES 193 (1988).
7. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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and without prior board approval, approached Jay Pritzker, a social
acquaintance, and negotiated a sale of Trans Union to a Pritzkercontrolled entity for $55 per share. Pritzker and Van Gorkom concluded their discussions on a Thursday and Pritzker insisted that the
Trans Union Board act within three days. That proved to be more
time than Van Gorkom needed. He convened a board meeting for
Saturday noon. Saturday morning was reserved so that he could
break the news to senior management of the company, as only two
of them were previously aware of the deal.
At first, events proceeded pretty much as Van Gorkom and
Pritzker had planned. The Trans Union Board met, gave perfunctory
consideration to the merger proposal and, two hours after the convening, approved the $690 million deal that would transform the
company from a publicly-held entity to part of the Pritzker empire.
The board had no prior notice that they were convened to consider
the sale of the company, no documentation to review, no written
summary of the terms, and, of greatest importance, nothing to
support the adequacy of the price being offered.
Thereafter, events did not proceed according to script. Several
members of senior management sought to upset the deal, purportedly
because they felt the price was inadequate. That revolt led to further
negotiations, some amendments to the agreement, approaches by
potential purchasers, and litigation. All of this was for naught. The
shareholders approved the deal, and the transaction was consummated.
But the story did not end there. The final chapter was written
by the Delaware Supreme Court four years later, when it held that
the Trans Union directors breached their fiduciary duty of care in
approving the merger agreement. In a lengthy opinion, the Court
reviewed what the directors did and did not do, the former being
a much shorter list than the latter. In brief, the directors approved
the price with an inadequate basis for doing so. The record suggested
that the company could have been sold for more money, and the
Court said the directors would be liable for the difference.8
To the authors of Board Games, this case marks somewhat of a
turning point in corporate law, implying that the cavalier attitude
of the Trans Union Board would not have given rise to liability in
earlier years. This is a questionable conclusion. While it is true that
there are few reported cases holding directors liable for breach of
8. Id. at 893.
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the duty of due care, there are few exonerating them on the merits.
These cases just do not get tried very often. 9 The law was fairly
clear that directors could be liable for failing to give adequate attention
to their duties.' ° What was unclear was whether directors would be
liable for their simple negligence, or whether their misfeasance had
to be more serious. On this score, Smith v. Van Gorkom was welcome
news to the nation's corporate directors: the standard, at least in
Delaware, is gross negligence."
More importantly, the Trans Union directors were not held
liable for exercising poor judgment, which would indeed have been
a significant precedent, bit for not adequately informing themselves
before making such a momentous decision. Thus, Smith tells directors
that they needn't fear second-guessing by the courts, so long as they
adequately document their actions. The same judgment, with the
right paper (like a copy of the agreement), likely would have avoided
judicial scrutiny.
The lasting practical effect of Smith may be, at best, that directors
more carefully document the reasons that they proceeded as they
did. Corporate counsel are likely to integrate the teachings of Smith
in their standard advice for corporate board meetings to remove any
doubt that the board action was properly approved. 2 One cannot
conclude from Smith that directors will exercise greater control over
senior management or more independence from it. The real question
following Smith is whether the courts will cut through this formalism
when director action is challenged and the board can demonstrate
the due deliberation called for by Smith.
Whatever significance one might have attributed to Smith, and
its effect on the balance of power within a corporation, is undercut
by the dramatic turn that state statutory law has taken since Smith,
and because of it. Many states, led by Delaware, have amended
their corporate codes to limit director liability for breach of the duty
of due care. A Delaware corporation may now provide in its charter
that directors are not liable for monetary damages for failing to
exercise due care.' 3 This may be the real legacy of Smith: to the

9. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 126 (1986).
10. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
11. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873,
12. See, e.g., Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom

After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986). Other states have followed
Suit, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 5 7-3-101 (Supp. 1988).
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extent that some murky precedents in corporate law suggested that
directors might be liable for their simple negligence, charter provisions
can now make it clear that directors will not be liable for even their
gross negligence. That, in turn, strengthens the hand of management
vis-aL-vis the board, for with an important threat of liability removed,
the board has even less incentive to stand up to management.
Smith v. Van Gorkom is unusual in that the directors were challenged for approving a takeover of the company; in the typical case,
the directors are sued for thwarting a tender offer. Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.," another case highlighted in the book, arose from
such a suit. Mesa made a tender offer for Unocal and sued to enjoin
a defensive tactic that Unocal adopted to defeat Mesa's unwanted
bid. Unocal's maneuver consisted of a tender offer for its own shares,
structured to exclude Mesa, and with the practical effect of precluding
Mesa from buying the Unocal shares tendered to Mesa. The Delaware
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Unocal, and in so doing made
clear that targets of hostile takeover bids can, at least under some
circumstances, adopt measures designed to defeat those bids, even
if those measures call for discrimination among its shareholders.
But the authors do not cite Unocal because of its broad holding;
rather, they are attracted to the court's language that places new
restrictions on the target board of directors. The Court said that
before defending against a tender offer, the board must determine
that the bid poses a threat to the company. If they so find, any
defensive action they adopt must be "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed." Presumably, Unocal shows the key role the board
plays in the tender offer arena: it must make judgments concerning
the effect of a tender offer on the company and must be able to
justify its response.
But the analysis of Unocal in Board Games illustrates somewhat
more than this. The authors show the profound influence of Unocal's
chairman, Fred L. Hartley, on developing Unocal's strategy. Whether
purposeful or not, the impression that comes across in this chapter
is that Hartley regarded Unocal as his company, and by god, no
upstart like Boone Pickens (Mesa's chairman) was going to take it
over. Indeed, this impression-the dominance of a company's chief
executive-comes across in every chapter. The Delaware Supreme
Court decision in Unocal does not change that dominance very much;

14. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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it only makes clear what the board must do if it is going to agree
with the strategy devised by management.
Subsequent decisions bear this out. In numerous Delaware cases
the courts have consistently agreed with the board's decision that a
hostile tender offer posed a threat to the company. As to the reasonableness of the response, the Delaware courts have differed with
board decisions, finding that the response was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed in several cases. Each one of these cases
may be cited as an example of board capitulation to the whims of
management. One post-Board Games case, Robert M. Bass Group, Inc.
v. Evans,15 involving a struggle for control of MacMillan, Inc., illustrates the point particularly well.
In late-1987, at about the time the Bass Group was acquiring
a significant stake in MacMillan, management of the large publishing
concern was already worried about a possible hostile takeover of the
company. It had in place some antitakeover devices and was planning
some others, including a complicated restructuring plan. Before that
plan could be implemented, however, Bass proposed a cash buy-out
of MacMillan at $64 per share and indicated a willingness to negotiate
a higher price.
Bass's offer to negotiate was largely ignored by the company
and shortly thereafter a "Special Committee" of the board, that had
been formed just a week earlier, approved the restructuring plan
that management had been developing for several months. The
Special Committee's investment banker (which had been chosen by
management of the company), valued the plan as worth $64.15 per
share to the MacMillan shareholders. Bass responded with an offer
to purchase all of the shares at $73 per share or to fund a restructuring
nearly identical to the one approved by the Special Committee, except
that the shareholders would receive more cash and management of
the company would be treated like all other shareholders, thereby
foregoing the special treatment that the restructuring plan provided.
Both of these offers were rejected by the Special Committee.
Happily, the court's decision set aside the restructuring plan
approved by the Special Committee. But the case really stands for
further proof of the influence of management over the board. The
management-proposed restructuring was, in a word, outrageous. It
had the effect of dividing MacMillan into two independent companies,
one holding the publishing assets, and the other the non-publishing

15. 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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assets, including information services, instruction, retail merchandising, and a home learning and reference material division. Management, consisting of four individuals, would end up owning thirtynine percent of the latter company (Information), and obtain a
significant voting stake in the publishing company (Publishing).
This miracle of high finance was possible, in part, because in
the months immediately preceding the restructuring, management
had been given over 400,000 shares of the company and options to
purchase an additional 200,000 shares. It was possible because the
Special Committee, consisting of directors "independent" of the
company, did not negotiate on behalf of the shareholders over the
terms of the restructuring. It was possible because no one negotiated
with the Bass Group. In short, it was possible because the management of MacMillan, led by its forceful chief executive Edward
P. Evans, was determined that its control of the company would
not be lost to outsiders, for what else can explain the board's willingness to shift ownership of a substantial portion of MacMillan's
assets from the shareholders to management in the face of a much
more lucrative offer from the Bass Group?
Instances of true board independence from management are
rare. The much publicized auction of RJR Nabisco, Inc. in late
1988, where management's leveraged buy-out proposal was rejected
by the board in favor of a lower third party offer, was remarkable
because of its rarity. The popular press reports on the affair suggested
that personality conflicts between RJR's flamboyant president, F.
Ross Johnson, and the chair of a special committee of the RJR
board, Charles Hugel, played a role in the outcome of the contest.
Hugel, apparently, was so put off by Johnson's tactics that he refused
to give management the usual advantage it enjoys in these contests.',
The captains of modern day industry, like Johnson, Hartley,
Evans, Pickens, and the others discussed in Board Games, often have
only nominal supervision from their respective boards of directors.
The panacea for this state of affairs has long been supposed to be
the emergence, as a force in America's board rooms, of a cadre of
independent directors-that is, individuals not otherwise employed
by, or beholden to, the company they serve and, therefore, not
subject to the domination and influence of the company's chief
executive officer. In numbers, at least, the independent directors

16. Saporito, How Ross Johnson Blew the Buy'out, Fortune, Apr. 24, 1989, at
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have arrived, as most large companies have boards with a majority
of independent directors. But being independent of management,
and being able to exercise judgment independent of management's,
are apparently not the same thing. This is the message of Board
Games.

